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The purpose of this thesis is to have a closer look at moral relativism, and the problem of                                   
immersion. Most people will accept that the truth of judgements are relative to certain                           
standards, a moral framework. Most people however, will not accept the fact that just because                             
morality is relative to a person’s moral framework, that we should accept and tolerate what                             
they say and do. The fact that we can explain why someone does such and such, or has                                   
certain beliefs that clash with our moral convictions does not promote the idea that we should                               
simply tolerate their views. This thesis then, will set out to flesh out some of the attributes of                                   
moral relativism, and have a closer look at them.  
 
I will mainly concentrate on moral motivation in the form of internalism, and the problem of                               
immersion which arises when we are faced with the problem of disagreement. In the first                             
chapter we are simply introduced to the issues, and by the end of the first chapter we are in a                                       
position to say that both types of moral relativism which this thesis some problems regarding                             
immersion which they must overcome. I suggest by having a deeper look at how they account                               
for moral motivation, that we can find some solution to the problem of immersion. By the end                                 
of the second chapter, we learn that it is both the cognitivist features and the non­cognitivist                               
features of a moral judgment which helps us account for morality in a convincing way. The                               

















































Moral relativism is the meta­ethical theory that there is no absolute moral code which                           
governs us all. There is a myriad of different understandings and opinions on moral matters                             
which all are equal to each other. In a way, Moral Relativism, is the acceptance that morality                                 
is a truly complex concept. In this paper I will deal with Moral Relativism as a descriptive                                 
theory, trying to illustrate how morality actually function in the actual world. It is interesting                             
then, to see how the moral language behaves when two people can disagree over a matter,                               
and both of them in a way would still be completely right. I will argue that overcoming the                                   
problem of immersion is one of the most important problems. Moral relativism needs to                           




Although often considered controversial or even radical, moral relativism has been discussed                       
for a long time. Very vaguely we can explain Moral Relativism as the claim that there are                                 
different moral truths about the same question. In a massively globalized world where                         
cultures meet, communicate and sometimes disagree over esthetic, etiquette and moral issues                       
an understanding of Moral Relativism is needed. If we were to understand morality                         
objectively (sometimes referred to as Moral Absolutism) we often argue that certain moral                         
judgements are universal. Such as “Killing is wrong”, “You should not steal” etc. These are                             
often considered to be endorsed by all groups of people in the civilized world, a cross­cultural                               
rule, so to speak. There seems to be more to morality than this. The fact that there are                                   
numerous countries in the world that endorses capital punishment sometimes makes us                       
change the general judgement “killing is wrong” into “killing is wrong, unless enforced by an                             
official organ of the state”. The moral judgement often deemed universal “You should not                           
steal” seems to wither when big corporations steal patents of other corporations, and improve                           
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them in their products. This seems overlooked and not important in the big picture, as long as                                 
the final product is publicly accepted as a good or better product.   1
 
One way of pinpointing what we could mean by Moral Relativism is that certain groups of                               
people will judge a moral statement as right, while another group of people will not. The                               
easiest way to see this in practice is by looking at cultural differences. Some smaller cultures                               
endorses the practice of genital mutilation of women, while the rest of the world, mostly,                             
frown upon this practice and calls it disgusting, barbaric and immoral. This illustrates a                           
worthy point, but it does not rightly illustrate Moral Relativism. I want to stress that I am not                                   
arguing that we, as moral agents, should treat morality as relative in the way that one would                                 
make judgements. I am not arguing that we should tolerate everything another person, group                           
of people or culture does just because we can explain morality as relative. What Moral                             
Relativism should be, and in fact is, is a metaethical theory that will help us describe how                                 
morality works. One’s own moral convictions is what makes morality possible at all, the fact                             
that we can disagree about them to the level that we do is what makes Moral Relativism a                                   
good candidate to explaining how that actually happens. 
 
Diversity seems to suggest that seeking a better understanding of moral relativism is                         
worthwhile. Consider the fact that in Norway we still argue whether abortion is morally                           
acceptable or not. It is a discussion that has gone on for decades, both sides of the discussion                                   
arguing based on empirical facts and arguments about what is a human right or not. The                               
disagreement is deep, and it splits friends and family on the issue. As a group of people, as a                                     
neighbourhood, group of friends or family, we are not inclined to identify said group with our                               
moral convictions. The ​prima facie ​disagreement that we so clearly can see being practiced                           
on key issues is an indicator that right and wrong isn’t always prone to universal                             
understanding.  
 
Now it is definitely worth explaining that the question of disagreement is a deep one within                               
the discussions of Moral Relativism. It is worth some attention as it is one of the classic                                 
questions raised in metaethics, and The Philosophy of Language. The general idea that                         
sparked one of the classic issues of disagreement in relation to Moral Relativism is that, if a                                 
1 The way production of mobile devices is seemingly a sphere where stealing ideas is accepted. 
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person expresses the assertion that “It is wrong to D”, it can be said that what that person is in                                       
fact uttering is “According to my moral convictions, it is wrong to D”. If we interpret the                                 
former assertion as the latter we are not actually giving a moral judgement, but rather stating                               
a fact. It is more along the lines like “Sara’s pants are blue”. This will be explicated when we                                     
take a deeper look into certain areas of Moral Relativism. 
 
The discussions around morality in general belongs in several different spheres.                     
Disagreement is part of one of these spheres, another is motivation. In his 1994 book “The                               
Moral Problem” Michael Smith outlined the problems facing morality like this: 
 
● Moral Judgements expresses objective facts about an agents beliefs of what is right                         
for ​her​ to do. 
● If someone expresses a moral judgement that it is right for that someone to Φ then that                                 
someone is motivated to​ Φ. 
● An agent’s motivation depends on said agent’s desire to reach that goal, and that                           
agents ability to achieve that goal. 
 
Although a classical problem I will not only focus on the problem of disagreement, but rather                               
in relation to the second statement concerning motivation. What these three have in common                           
is however the fact that we’re dealing with moral judgements. “It is wrong of P to D” is an                                     
example of such a judgement. Critics of certain types of Moral Relativism argues that the                             
negation of such a judgement is not actually expressing disagreement, but rather they are                           
stating two different facts. “It is wrong of P to D” and “it is not­wrong of P to D” is then                                         2
interpreted as “According to my moral convictions it is wrong of P to D” and “According to                                 
my moral convictions it is not­wrong of P to D”, the latter set of sentences is thought to be                                     
equivalent to sentences such as “The sky is blue” and “The sky is not­blue”. 
 
Moral convictions as I have called them here are often referred to as ‘moral frameworks’, I                               




Problem” points out, one of the platitudes surrounding morality is that it should be practical.                            3
What this in essence means is that a moral judgement should not just be a statement of fact, it                                     
should also have a motivating force. It is of my understanding that, if moral judgements have                               
no motivating force, then arguing about whether they can express disagreement falls a bit to                             
the side. 
 
In my thesis I will first go through some of the general aspects of Moral Relativism. Most                                 
readers of philosophy are familiar with the concept, but it is important never the less that we                                 
are all on the same page when we are about to tackle a core issue about morality. In all it’s                                       
controversy Moral Relativism has founds itself rethought on many levels. And as Gilbert                         
Harman puts it, it’s easy enough to take up a ​dissuasive ​line of arguments against Moral                               
Relativism: 
 
“They define moral relativism as an inconsistent thesis. For example, they define it as the                             
assertion that (​a​) there are no universal principles of one’s own group, where this latter                             
principle (​b​) ​is​ supposed to be a universal moral principle.”  4
 
I agree with Harman that it is easy to assert that such a way of thinking is not consistent, but                                       
also that defenders of Moral Relativism should be able to find some better definition. I will                               
introduce the reader to one of the defenders of Moral Relativism by looking at Gilbert                             
Harman’s article ​“Moral Relativism Defended” ​and his contribution to the book ​“Moral                       5
Relativism and Moral Absolutism”​. It was how I was initially introduced to Moral                         6
Relativism and I feel it works as a great introduction to the theme. Harman’s thinking has                               
been greatly criticised by many thinkers, but it is still very much relevant reading. In the same                                 
line of reasoning, I will also go through James Dreier’s article ​“Internalism and Speaker                           








It would not be a proper introduction to Moral Relativism unless we have a look at what                                 
some thinkers have called “Genuine Relativism” or “Alethic Relativism” . Made famous by                       7
thinkers like MacFarlane and Kölbel, it serves as an alternate way of treating moral                           
judgements compared to Harman and Dreier. Never the less, it is important to look at this                               
realm of relativism as well, if we are to treat moral judgements as practical in the sense as                                   
motivating, or with the disposition to inspire motivation such a theory must in virtue be able                               
to account for several versions of moral relativism. Following the general theme of this first                             
part I will also go through some of the objections raised against Moral Relativism. The first                               
chapter will also introduce the problem of immersion, what we know about moral relativism                           
from the first chapter should suffice to be clear why the problem is a real one. 
 
The second chapter I will dedicate to moral motivation. It serves one of the core elements in                                 
the discussion regarding morality, and I will mainly focus this chapter on having moral                           
relativism account for internalism. It also becomes clear why immersion is a problem which                           
exists within the realm of moral motivation as well, as we tackle a problem posed by Michael                                 
Smith. 
 
In the third, and final chapter we revisit the problem posed by the end of the first chapter. If                                     
moral relativism could account for the problem of immersion, we would be able to assert that                               
moral relativism can successfully account for genuine disagreement and moral motivation.                     
Given the different types of moral relativism, I would say that they have two ways of going                                 
about to account for immersion­­ by the traditional contextualists route, or by the genuine                           





If explained crudely moral relativism would be something like this: ​The truth­value of a                           
moral judgement is relative to some moral standard. Although this sentence is very crude in                             
it’s nature, it can be used to explain some phenomena. Moral standard in this sense can be a                                   
cultural tradition or based on a society’s willingness to accept certain actions etc. It can also                               
7 Kölbel, Max (2004), López de Sa, Dan (2007) 
9/67 
be used to explain how morality in certain places has changed over time. For instance, the                               
sentence ‘it is morally acceptable to hold slaves’ is a true sentence if we were in 1800’s                                 
Mississippi. If the sentence is uttered today it would not be true. In the same way this way of                                     
explaining moral relativism also explains cultural differences in contemporary times. The                     
sentence ‘it is morally wrong to circumcise(genitally mutilate) women’ is a true judgement in                           
most parts of the modern world, but it’s not true in a few African tribes. What this means, and                                     
what moral relativists argue, is that there are no absolute moral truths that govern everyone.                             
This is a rather radical claim, because when we say that there are no absolute moral truths we                                   
are inclined to argue that ‘everybody agrees that’ ​killing is wrong,​or ​it is wrong to steal​ etc.  
 
An important question is of course, what is morality? My personal opinion, and I believe                             
there are a lot of moral philosophers out there who agree with me, is that morality is                                 
something that motivates us to act according to some conviction. This conviction then is what                             
we could call the “moral framework”. However, what is interesting right now is the concept                             





Gilbert Harman wrote an article in 1975 called “Moral Relativism Defended” where he                         
outlined a rather interesting type of take on moral relativism. What he calls a ‘soberly logical                               
thesis’ is supposed to work as an explanation of why in certain genres of utterances, the truth                                 
value of a moral judgement will always be relative to some standard. The genre in question                               
Harman calls ‘inner judgements’ of the form “A ought not to D”. The magic word in this                                 
sense is ​ought or ​should​. These words have more or less the same meaning, and according to                                 
Harman they are indexicals. They will not explain anything unless they have some form of                             
context. Harman implies that the nature of ​ought ​or should brings out a logically sound                             
relativism, as we shall see why.  
 
If Paul says that “Aaron should not make fun of the homeless guy”, according to Harman,                               
Paul is making the assumption that Aaron is going to agree with this statement: It is wrong of                                   
people to make fun of homeless people. On the other hand, in the obscene example, if Bryan                                 
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utters that “Aaron should make fun of the homeless guy” the statement is negated as: It is                                 
not­wrong of people to make fun of homeless people. Whether or not the statement is true is                                 
based on whoever utters the sentence. The reason is that inner judgements are fundamentally                           
different from ‘normal’ moral judgements like “Hitler is evil”, “Sarah is mean” or “Goodwyn                           
is righteous”. These sentences all explain something about someone's moral sentiment, but                       
they are merely statements about facts. They are not what Harman wants us to consider. To                               
explain what Harman wants us to explicate, consider the following:  
 
“We make inner judgements about a person only if we suppose that he is capable of                               
being motivated by the relevant moral considerations.”  8
 
When Paul claims that Aaron ought not to do ​something​, what he is actually doing is making                                   
a statement of which Paul believes Aaron would agree to. According to Harman it makes no                               
sense to utter a sentence of the form “A ought not to D” if the speaker does not believe it                                       
would motivate the listener. If we told the Terminator not to kill Sarah Connor, The                             
Terminator would not react. It would not have any meaning to the Terminator to make such a                                 
statement.   9
 
Now there is reason to reflect upon the fact that the indexicals ‘should’ and ‘ought’ does                               
promote relative truth values in other circumstances, than in morality. If I tell a person who is                                 
asking for directions to the closest hotel and I claim “You should go down the road and take a                                     
left”. There would be no meaning to this sentence unless I believed that my utterance would                               
promote his goal to find the hotel. We could differentiate between sentences like these, and                             
the ones above as ​normative ​and ​motivational. The latter type of sentences is ​normative                           
because they say something about how to reach a goal, that goal being relative to the speaker                                 








In his contribution alongside Judith Jarvis Thomson in “Moral Relativism and Moral                       
Absolutism” in 1996 Gilbert Harman puts forth a more refined version of his Moral                           
Relativism which as an overall theory of moral relativism explains morality in a more general                             





(I): “For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, ​it would be                               
morally wrong of P to D, has to be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, ​in                                     
relation to moral framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D. ​Similarly for other                                 
moral judgments.”   10
 
This definition of morality is loosely based on a comparison between moral judgements and                           
judgements about mass: 
 
(II): “For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form,​the mass of X is                                   
M​, has to be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form,​in relation to spatio­temporal                                 
framework F the mass of X is M​.”  11
 
Like the instances of using “should” or “ought” in a moral judgement, Harman consider                           
sentences of the form ​“It would be morally wrong of P to D” as inner judgements. What is                                   
interesting though in the last two quotes above from Harman’s contribution to the work                           
“Moral Relativism and Moral Absolutism” is that he considers moral judgements to be                         
relative in the same sense as judgements about mass. This has been criticized as we shall see                                 
in section 1.5 by thinkers like Paul Boghossian . Now one of the central claims in Harman’s                               12
theory is that when the speaker utters a moral judgement, of the form Harman considers an                               













Now let’s assume that both John and Sarah are presented with the exact same facts, and both                                 






Now again, assuming that both John and Sarah are reasonable people, with the exact same                             
facts about the matter, they still disagree about the matter at hand. It is a scenario that doesn’t                                   
sound far fetched at all to most people. I believe it’s safe to consider a great amount of moral                                     
discussions that are thrown around between people in open discussions, on social media etc.                           
where people do not have the exact amount of information, or people being completely                           
reasonable. But for sake of argument, let’s assume that in this case they are. John and Sarah                                 
are seemingly disagreeing about a moral matter, how do they talk about this? 
 
According to Harman it makes no sense for John and Sarah to make inner judgements about                               
each other since such sentences will not have the potential to motivate. It would make no                               
sense to tell The Terminator that he ​should not murder Sarah Connor. It is a far­off example,                                 
so let’s introduce one of Harman’s more famous examples to illustrate this point. The                           
contented employee of Murder Inc. is a person with a mafia­like mindset. His only real                             
conviction is to please his ‘family’, and other people are only potentially in the way of this                                 







 This all goes back to Harman’s proposal that inner judgements are ones that potentially                           
inspire or motivate the listener to what the speaker is saying. When this is not the case, which                                   
is quite often, we need to treat the moral judgements differently. Harman proposes a                           
quasi­absolutist approach to this problem. At first then, because of events such as the                           
Terminator example and the contented employee of Murder Inc moral relativism seems to                         
have some problems accounting for cases where there is genuine disagreement between                       
people. As mentioned in the introduction, a moral relativist theory should be able to account                             





As a theory James Dreier’s Speaker Relativism is closely related to Harman’s idea. In his                             
article ​Internalism and Speaker Relativism, Dreier, James (1990). ​Dreier outlines a                     
connection between the motivational aspect of internalism and relativism. His goal of the                         
paper is to explain internalism by asserting a form of relativism which he calls ‘Speaker                             
Relativism’. Considering Harman’s definition (II), we ought to see that Dreier’s is more or                           
less based on the same train of thought: “The Content of a moral therm itself depends on the                                   
most salient moral system in the context of use.”   15
 
An important part of both Dreier’s and Harman’s theories is that we are always speaking of                               
some moral system, framework, or convictions. Long overdue it’s time we took a closer look                             
at what a moral system is. One way of describing it is as ​the sum of a person’s or group’s                                       
moral convictions​.  
 
“On my proposed analysis, sentences containing moral terms straightforwardly express                   
propositions ­ though which propositions they express will vary with the context. So I can                             






James Dreier’s theory as mentioned is similar to Gilbert Harman’s, though his approach is                           
different. He proposes a two­level semantics for moral terms, very much like Harman: 
 




Relying on David Kaplan, Dreier wants us to consider that indexicals have a certain                           
character. When we use the term “x is good” the indexical’s asserted content will vary based                               
on the speaker’s moral framework. The character ‘good’ on the other hand will be the same.                               
Understanding the character of good is the same as understanding the extent of the word and                               
it helps the moral framework assert it’s belief. 
 
Aaron claims that “chocolate is good” is somewhat different from Aaron’s claim that “charity                           
is morally good”. Both of these expresses Aaron’s attitude towards something. Dreier                       
suggests that the moral claim expresses something about Aaron’s motivational attitudes                     
towards charity. Even though judgments about chocolate and charity is two vastly different                         
types of judgements, the ‘character’ of the term ‘good’ is the same. Having and                           
understanding of ​such​ a character is important to be able to make moral judgements.   
 





“If an agent judges that it is right to Φ in circumstances C, then she is motivated to Φ                                     
in circumstances C.” (Smith 1994) 
 
This is what would be called a strong definition of internalism. This definition is flawed                             
because it does not explain how some cases, it would not apply such as for people who                                 
suffers from depression or other afflictions to the mind or will. I will get back to discussing                                 
internalism in the second chapter, but for now it will suffice.  
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 Both Harman and Dreier proposes that moral judgements have an intrinsic link to motivation,                           
in other words what Dreier claims; that speaker relativism explains internalism is a very                           





On the face of it there seems to be minor difficulties between the two types of relativism as                                   
such. Of course the main element will persist: relativity. I will outline the general theme                             
which Max Kölbel sets forth to illustrate the distinguishment between Genuine Relativism                       
and Contextualism . I will then delve deeper into genuine relativism and have a look at                             17
MacFarlane’s theory, which is often thought as of the more successful of the genuinists. The                             
difference in relativity is what interests us here, and how that might impact motivation in the                               
world of moral relativism. 
 
Let’s explicate what we have said so far about genuine relativism with an example to pick out                                 
the main difference between the contextualists and the genuinists. Consider the sentence                       
“Abortion is wrong”. Thinkers A and B disagree on this matter and Kölbel regards this from                               






This is somewhat along the lines of how Kölbel pictures the propositional content changing                           
depending on the context. Crudely explained Kölbel claims that the contextualists are guilty                         
of something he calls ‘distortion of topic’ . In other words, because of contextualisms                         18





whether or not abortion is morally acceptable­­ but rather they are expressing some fact about                             
their moral framework. Let’s take a closer look to what is the case here. 
 






The trouble begins as Kölbel points out that A and B’s expressed propositions ​p and ~​p ​is                                 
propositionally equivalent to the explicit forms just mentioned above. This is somewhat of a                           
direct consequence of the contextualists idea of moral sentences acting like indexical                       
sentences. Now in transition to what exactly Genuine Relativism is, it is worth making note                             
of a distinction Kölbel illuminates when discussing contextualism:  19
 
A and B’s explicit utterances can be understood in both Strawsonian and Russellian ​fashions​.                           
What this in turn means is that when a proposition like A and B is uttered: “According to my                                     
moral framework ​p​” in the Strawsonian sense, this sentence is true iff there is such a                               
framework to begin with. If there is no such framework the utterance would not even succeed                               
in expressing a proposition. In the Russellian sense, the utterance also asserts the existence of                             
such a framework which is then referred to.  
 
In light of this it is time to explore Kölbel’s explanation of Genuine Relativism. One of the                                 
main concepts that sparks genuine relativism is what is called faultless disagreement. Max                         
Kölbel in his article “Genuine Relativism versus Indexical Relativism” attacks Harman and                       
Dreiers form of relativism. Genuine Relativism is supposed to apply to all types of relativism,                             
such as aesthetics or justification, but for the theme of this paper we will do as Kölbel and                                   
stick to Moral Relativism.  
 







Faultless Disagreement per se makes sense in a lot of circumstances, which are easily                           
imaginable. Such as when it comes to matters of taste. Most people can imagine and accept                               
the fact that some people do not find pasta tasty, while others does. It might however be a bit                                     
harder to accept in the case of morality.  
 
As mentioned above, contextualism place the element of relativity in a moral judgment’s                         
context to a moral framework. Genuine Relativists claims that the content expressed changes                         
independently from this context. Consider Kaplan’s two stages of semantics: “first, the                       
content expressed depends on the context of use, and then the truth value of ​that content                               
depends on the way the world is.” Clearly contextualism places the relativity in the first of                               21
these two stages, but the genuinists place it in the second. In a way we can say that the                                     
truth­value is determined by a certain set of parameters after the context of use is determined.                               
Kölbel calls this parameter a ​perspective​.  
 
Back in section 1.3 we had a look at James Dreier’s Speaker Relativism, which was closely                               
related to Harman’s theory. Dreier took use of a Kaplanian expression, namely ‘character’.                         
Dreier used this to explain how some words, such as ‘good’ would mean the same thing in all                                   
instances­­ even cross­language­wise. Kölbel takes use of this ‘character’ in a similar way as                           
the expressed content stays the same, but it’s relative truth­value changes. At this point we                             
should be closer to have a better distinction between Genuine Relativism and Contextualism,                         
and it is about time to take a closer look at, a perhaps more successful explanation of Genuine                                   
Relativism, John Macfarlane’s Non­indexical Contextualism. Even though not to be confused                     






MacFarlane introduces the term indexicality early in his 2009 paper as ‘dependence of                         
content on features of context’. He uses the term ​context sensitivity to explain how                           
truth­value features on context, but will argue that a non­indexical version of contextualism                         
will have an advantage over traditional contextualism (like Harman and Dreier). 
 
“[...] we should understand context sensitivity more broadly, as dependence of ​extension on                         
context. It is possible for an expression to be semantically context­sensitive, in this sense,                           
even if it has the same content at every context of use” (MacFarlane 2009) 
 





(2) An expression is ​context­ sensitive ​iff its extension at a context depends on features of the                               
context. 
 
MacFarlane seems to put ​extension and ​truth­value more or less in the same boat. If this is                                  
correct, what MacFarlane wants to do with this is to separate (1) and (2), for which Max                                 
Kölbel was some what criticised for conjoining by Dan Lopez de Sa (2007) 
 
MacFarlane argues that an expression can hold features of context­sensitivity, without                     
holding features of indexicality. In other words, just as (1) does not entail (2), the converse                               
also does not involve any entailment. This is the prerequisite for non­indexical contextualism.  
 
Imagine if you will a familiar example for many; “Fish tastes good”. For many people it’s a                                 
statement which isn’t always to case to be true at all times. Some people doesn’t like fish                                 
when their children, but grows to like it with time. When I was 11 the sentence “Fish tastes                                   
good” would have expressed a false proposition, but more than 10 years later I can agree.                               
However when people around me utters the sentence: “Fish does not taste good”, I don’t                             
actually disagree with them. The proposition expressed by them applied to me at one point                             
too, it’s more like it’s an incompatible view to my view. Whether or not the sentence “Fish is                                   
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good” is true or not depends on what time of my life I am asked. The Genuinists then, views                                     
the content to be the same in all contexts, but the truth­value of said proposition will vary                                 
with some parameter (in Kölbel’s case he calls it a perspective). The importance of                           
MacFarlane’s disjunction between Kaplan’s first and second stage (as mentioned earlier)                     
helps us illustrate how faultless disagreement can be possible. It remains to see still if we can                                 
successfully apply it to morality, as some view moral sentences as something special, and it                             
can sometimes be thought of as faulty to familiarize morality with something as trivial as                             
matters of taste. 
 
Now to recap from earlier, one of the main points of Genuine Relativism is to avoid that                                 
sentences, such as moral sentences like A​1​: “abortion is wrong” in it’s ​implicit form end up                               
like A: “according to my moral framework abortion is wrong” in it’s ​explicit form. Kölbel                             
explains the difference between Indexical Contextualism and Genuine Relativism as the                     
former being dependent on Kaplan’s first stage (1), and the latter relying on the second stage                               





This sentence is interpreted in three ways so far as we have come in our investigation of                                 
moral relativism. Harman and Dreier’s Indexical Contextualism will claim that the                     
propositional content expressed by A​1 will vary depending on who utters it, and their                           
respective framework, resulting in propositional equivalence with the explicit forms of the                       
sentence (A). And as Kölbel points out this view is vulnerable to ​distortion of topic ​.                             22
Kölbel’s answer to this is by sticking to the content. The sentence “Abortion is wrong” will                               
always express the proposition ‘abortion is wrong’ in it’s implicit sense. In Kölbel’s view the                             
sentence will express the same content, even if the context is changed. Kölbel’s view allows                             






Da Lopez de Sa labeled Kölbel’s theory ‘Radical Relativism’ to emphasize it’s distinction to                           
MacFarlane’s Non­Indexical Contextualism. MacFarlane draws the parallel between his train                   
of thought, and the distinction between ​eternalists ​and ​temporalists ​: 23
 
“On the eternalist view, the sentence [socrates is sitting] varies in truth value across times because it                                 
expresses different propositions at different times, and these propositions have different (eternal) truth                         
values On the temporalist’s view, the sentence [socrates is sitting] varies in truth value across times                               
because the (single) proposition the sentence expresses at all these times have different truth values                             
relative to different times of evaluation. [...]. Both agree that such sentences are                         
time­context­sensitive. But where the eternalist takes the time of the context to play a                           
content­determinative role, the temporalists takes it to play a circumstance­determinative role. Thus,                       
the eternalist, but not the temporalist, takes tensed sentences to be time­indexical. The temporalist’s                           
position, according to which tensed sentences are time­context­sensitive but not time­indexical, is an                         
example of ​nonindexical contextualism​.” (MacFarlane 2009, p.p 234 ­­ brackets added by me) 
 
When faced with the same utterance A​1​:“Abortion is wrong”, the non­indexical contextualists                       
will recognize that the content expressed by said sentence will always be the same, but the                               
context of who, when and where the sentence is uttered will determine it’s truth­value. In this                               
way it is similar to Kölbel’s theory, and different from the Traditional Contextualism asserted                           
by Harman and Dreier. The disjunction between Kaplan’s two stages however, does ensure                         
that a three­place predicate is sufficient (Context, content and ​parameter​). This was the main                           
line of critique towards Kölbel by Dan Lopez de Sa (2007) , non­indexical contextualism                         24














An obvious objection towards thinkers like Harman who compares moral relativism to                       
relativism about mass (or similar judgements) , is the asymmetry of what we want to mean                             25
by moral judgments as opposed to that of judgments about mass. The bulk of the objection                               
attacks the line of reasoning important to Harman’s view, namely the implicitness of moral                           
judgements. The idea is that if applied to physics we are stuck with a completely different                               









The concern towards the comparison between physics and morality is due to the fact that the                               
explicit and implicit forms of the sentences does not mean the same thing in the different                               
types of sentences. As we already know from Kölbels concern about the distortion of topic in                               
cases of M​2 and M​1​. But this is not what we are mainly concerned about here either. The                                   
biggest difference is that in cases like P​1 and P​2​, it makes perfect sense to state a fact in the                                       
explicit sense. It is actually what we want to express with the implicit form. In the case of                                   
morality, it’s the other way around. It is this asymmetry which concerns Boghossian, and that                             
if we are to follow the fact that if we utter P​1​, we actually want to mean P​2​. In the case of                                           
morality, we want to utter M​1​, but we don’t want it to mean M​2​, because then we fall into the                                       
trap of distortion of topic. 
 
The most natural response to this is of course that the comparison between moral judgements                             
and judgements of e.g mass and locomotion is merely suggestive towards the fact that there                             








Even as we have seen over and over as a steady argument against the traditional                             
contextualists like Harmand and Dreier, the argument of distortion of topic can also be                           
answered. Let me repeat the definition given by Harman in section 1.2: 
 
(II): For the purposes of assigning truth conditions, a judgment of the form, ​it would be                               
morally wrong of P to D, has to be understood as elliptical for a judgment of the form, ​in                                     
relation to moral framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D.   
 
Kölbel in his article “How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and Defend Indexical                         
Relativism” (2007) proposes a solution. His solution is to discard the semantic interpretation                         
of Harman, where we utter one thing(implicitly), but mean another(explicitly)­­ to the more                         
pragmatic interpretation of presupposing moral frameworks. In the third chapter we are going                         
to have a closer look at how this pragmatic interpretation might look like, with respects to                               
immersive features and Kölbel’s illumination of the solution. This does seem to shed better                           
light on what Harman meant by his definitions, however the whole term ​understood as                           
elliptical ​is elusive and hard to understand. It does make his explanation of relativism a bit                               
unclear. Even so we are faced with this interpretation a more reasonable way of viewing                             
moral judgements, as I believe we can safely assume that people would assert the implicit                             
version of a moral judgement, over the explicit version­­ unless they specifically want to                           
make a statement of fact about their moral convictions. It is unclear to me how well this                                 









 I take it that the fact that we are seemingly disagreeing about morality, and that we are able to                                     
give good explanations of why we disagree as evidence for moral relativism . Even so there                             27
has been a good amount of discussions whether or not we are actually disagreeing when we                               
are expressing our moral judgements. 
 
In the case of ‘distortion of topic’ as just mentioned above the evidence of non­disagreement                             
seems obvious. If we are stating facts about our moral frameworks, we are not actually                             
disagreeing about our opinions, so to speak­­ as mentioned earlier as well. 
 
The question still remains whether or not the genuinists promise of content preservation will                           
allow us to maintain that genuine disagreement. The term genuine disagreement can be an                           
elusive one, but as the ‘distortion of topic’ argument helps us understand that we want to                               
stick to moral judgments rather than statements of fact, we are looking for something beyond                             
just having a proposition and it’s negation being incompatible with each other.  
 
“It looks like an appealing way to formulate a relativist view of morality because it promises                               
simultaneously to preserve genuine moral judgement and, hence, genuine moral disagreement,                     
while acknowledging that there are no absolute moral facts.” (Paul Boghossian 2011 p.p. 60) 
 
The question of faultless disagreement is of course important here. What we can assume is                             
that if genuine relativism is consistent, then faultless disagreement will also be a very good                             
argument for sticking to such a theory if we would like to promote moral relativism.                             
Boghassian labels Genuine Relativism as ‘Alethic Relativism’, or relativism about truth­­                     
which as far as we know about how thinkers like Kölbel and MacFarlane places the element                               
of relativity is a fair label to give them. But Faultless Disagreement does not come without                               








(2) If D judges validly that p, it will also be valid for D to judge that ​it’s true that p​.                                       
(Truth is Disquotational within a perspective) 
(3) If D judges that ​It’s true that p then D must, on pain of incoherence, judge that ​It’s                                   
false that not­p​. 
(4) If D judges that ​It’s false that not­p​, then D must, on the pain of incoherence, judge                                 
that anyone who judges ​not­p​ is making a mistake. 
Therefore, 





The argument is very convincing. After all, if we have a conviction which someone else does                               
not share with us­­ we should be inclined to believe that they have made a mistake                               
somewhere in their reasoning, or else we should question our own. I think that this argument                               
is very hard­hitting. I mentioned earlier in the introduction that I don’t endorse for us as                               
moral subjects to view morality as relativistic. If we did we would have to also endorse                               
faultless disagreement, and I don’t think that accepting faultless disagreement from a first                         
person perspective is a plausible conclusion for anyone. 
 
Gilbert Harman does however attempt to solve this problem, by adding to his original                           
definition (I) (see section 1.2) a clause about​ objective ​truth conditions: 
 
(III): For the purposes of assigning ​objective truth conditions, a judgement of the form ​it                               
would be morally wrong of P to D​, has to be understood elliptical for a judgement of the form,                                     
in relation to moral framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D​. Similarly for other                                   
moral judgements. (Harman 1996 p.p. 43) 
 
The purpose of adding this clause is to show that when we disagree, we express our moral                                 
judgements as if they were objective truths. Even so they are in reality relative to a certain set                                   
of parameters. If this argument holds, then given the pragmatic interpretation of Harman’s                         
theory proposed by Kölbel, it might actually be the best contender to explain moral                           
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disagreement for relativists, which actually is genuine disagreement. The other solution to                       





This chapter and it’s introduction has so far not tackled one of our main concerns. This first                                 
chapter tackles moral relativism in itself, and some of the difficulties it phases. In the                             
introduction I presented some common thoughts and ideas about morality, and I asserted that                           
I believe some of this is an illusion. It does not give proper credit to what morality actually is.                                     
I view Moral Relativism as a metaethical theory, which perhaps is the best suited to give an                                 
explanation of how morality works. I then introduced in Section 1.2 and 1.3 some aspects of                               
a theory called Indexical Contextualism, with respects to Gilbert Harman and James Dreier. I                           
established, successfully I hope, that the core feature of this theory is that it places the                               
relativity with who ever utters the sentence. In other words, the content of an expressed                             
sentence will vary with the context (who utters it, depending on their moral convictions). We                             
then had a look at what some people have called Genuine Relativism, and we established the                               
main difference between the two of these is that they place the element of relativity in                               
different places. The main difference is that the genuinists propose the content to be                           
preserved, even though different contexts will give us different parameters to say whether or                           
not a the expressed proposition of a sentence is true or not. After section 1.4’s look into an                                   
alternative form of relativism, we went through some objections and how one may respond to                             
these in section 1.5.  
 
We can argue that a lot of morality owes the outcome of what’s right or wrong based on                                   
where and when in the world a moral judgement is uttered. For simplicity let’s keep it to this                                   
actual world. There are many interesting views in morality born out of thought experiments                           
of alternative worlds, but I do not wish to go into that at this point of time. Moral judgements                                     
are in one way different from other judgements in as they involve some form of conviction                               
from the speaker. When Marta tells Robert that “It is morally wrong to have an abortion” it                                 
says something about her convictions. If on the other hand Marta tells Robert that “He should                               
do his homework and be on time for lectures” it is a normative statement about how she                                 
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believes Robert should form his life around getting by school. We can argue that both of                               
these sentences involve some form of motivation, but the moral judgement are more                         
commonly accepted to be different from a normative judgement. In the next chapter we are                             
going to have a look at the connection between having a belief, and being motivated to act                                 
accordingly. 
 
The claim I am going to defend is that moral judgements in relativism depend on internalism,                               
because of internalism’s intrinsic nature of containing a motivational force. The natural                       
starting point then is to try to break down James Dreier’s claim that his speaker relativism                               
explains internalism. From there on we are going to have a look at how different versions of                                 
internalist account, and put them to the test. If we were to be able to satisfactorily account for                                   
motivation, could we also have an account which helps us understand more of how to solve                               



























As mentioned in the introduction, the goal of this thesis is not to assess Moral Relativism in                                 
itself but in relation to moral motivation. In section 1.3 we had a brief look at James Dreier’s                                   
‘Speaker Relativism’, which as mentioned is very similar to the ‘soberly logical thesis’ by                           
Gilbert Harman. Dreier claims that his speaker relativism will account for internalism­­ this                         
chapter will devote the first sections to introduce internalism in general, before going into                           
closer looks of some examples in relation to the theories we investigated in chapter 1. First of                                 
all let me repeat the strong formulation of internalism, from section 1.3 and why it is too                                 
strong: 
 
(SI) “If an agent judges that it is right to Φ in circumstances C, then she is motivated                                   
to Φ in circumstances C.  30
 
This formulation of internalism is as mentioned often called the ‘strong argument/definition’.                       
It is flawed because it as mentioned earlier can not account for cases where people suffer                               
from psychological inflictions which can render an agent judging something to be good, or                           
the right thing to do­­ but still lacking the desire to pursue such a good thing. The other way                                     
around is also works as when a kleptomaniac/compulsive liar may judge an action to be bad,                               





(PR) “If an agent judges that it is right to Φ in circumstances C, then either she is                                   
motivated to Φ in circumstances C or she is practically irrational” (ibid.) 
 
The connection between the strong formulation, and what Smith labeled the ​practicality                       
requirement is quite clear however : There is an intrinsic connection between an agent’s                         31
beliefs, and her being motivated to act accordingly. Let me clarify along with Dreier that                             
motivation does not mean action­­ it is one of the components which needs to be there for one                                   
to act upon their beliefs. Some have claimed for example that when a person judges                             
something to be good, and then has a desire to attain said "​goodness​", this person will be                                 
motivated to act accordingly. This is of course a very crude example of the internalist relation                               
between having beliefs, and having motivation. For readers who are new to the concept, it                             
should be enough of an explanation in section 2.1 to follow the rest of the chapter, as is the                                     
intention. Like most things I think Internalism is better illustrated by examples, and given                           
what we examined in the first chapter of this paper, I believe it’s time to take a closer look on                                       
Internalism and how it relates to different theories in the realm of Moral Relativism. 
 
Already there is a form of moral relativism which I have not yet given any space in this                                   
paper, namely Expressivism. It is vastly different because as it differs from the theories I                             
have looked at so far in virtue of being non­cognitivist. What that in essence means is that an                                   
expressivist does not view moral judgements as ​beliefs​. I want to focus on cognitivist theories                             
in this paper, to follow the same theme, but as an introduction to internalism Expressivism is                               
a great illustration of the intrinsic nature between moral judgements and motivation. 
 
Instead of beliefs, expressivists maintains that their moral judgements expresses an attitude                       








This is the result of viewing moral judgements not as beliefs, but simply as expressing pro­                               
and con­ attitudes. As with anything there are some aspects which Expressivism can account                           
for very well and there are some which Expressivism can not. To follow up from where we                                 
left off in 1.5, Expressivism does not suffer from any of the traditional pitfalls of                             
disagreement. Even though it is not in the strictest sense moral relativism, as in it does not                                 
have traditional truth­aptitudeness since their judgements does not express any propositions,                     
we can maintain that Expressivism is in it’s extension relativist. Since in essence it only                             
maintains that our moral judgements simply are expressions of pro­ and con­attitudes towards                         
what’s ‘good’ it is very individualistic. It does not either suffer from the problems of                             
‘distortion of topic’, and the problem of ‘perspectival immersion’ is also not something this                           
theory would topple over from. But the strongest side to this moral theory is that it is                                 
inherently internalistic, and explains internalism very well.  
 
As opposed to when expressing beliefs, when moral judgements are expressing attitudes they                         






The idea that something is ‘good’ then, is enough to be motivated towards that ‘goal’.                             
However, Expressivism faces a lot of difficulties and a lot of criticism. Most famously what                             
has been retained as a very successful argument against the expressivists is the classic                           
‘Frege­Geach’ problem which allows us to see the utility of being able to express                           

















The Frege­Geach problem is often called the ‘embedding problem’ for this reason. When we                           
supplement the proposition asserted in (P1) with the expressed attitude from (B1), we have                           
trouble actually using the expressed attitudes in larger sentences such as: Negations,                       
questions, etc. 
 
In the introduction to this paper I referred to a taxonomy made by Michael Smith(1994) . In                               34
short we are left pondering whether these three statements are true, as some have deemed                             
them inconsistent or just plain simply false: (​a​) Moral judgements expresses propositions in                         
the form of objective belief, (​b​) expressing a moral judgement is the same as expressing                             
motivation to act accordingly, and (​c​) that having a belief (motivation) + desire →                           
motivation. In the first chapter we showed that in order for relativist theories to fulfill (​a​) they                                 
need to overcome the argument of (perspectival) Immersion. In this section we will see if we                               
can defend (​b​) which in essence is trying to see whether or not the relativist theories we have                                   
looked at so far can account for internalism. To successfully do so they must also do so while                                   
maintaining (​a​), and to help us we are going to see whether they can comply with Michael                                 









As James Dreier claims his moral theory will explain internalism, Michael Smith spinning his                           
internalist wheel lands on the conclusion that it is not that simple. But first, let’s get to know                                   
Dreier’s Speaker Relativism a bit more than the short introduction in section 1.3 allowed us                             
to.  
 
So far we have more or less established that the practicality requirement is a much better                               
suited formulation of internalism than what the strong formulation can provide. In the first                           
chapter we established that Speaker Relativism falls under the label Indexical Contextualism,                       
and along with that sort of relativity to moral judgements. Let’s use a simple example to                               
illustrate how Dreier imagines this working out, recognizing that the strong formulation of                         
internalism is “too strong”, he proposes something he calls ​modest internalism ​:  35
 
(MI): When an agent A judges that it is right to Φ in circumstances C, she will under                                   
normal conditions be motivated to Φ.  
 
In short, there is a necessary connection between A’s judgement that Φ­ing is wrong, and A’s                               
motivation to act accordingly . But in reality it’s not that simple to state such a rule. The                                 36
biggest problem with Dreier's reformulation is that it hinges on a state of ‘normality’: 
 
“How then shall we explain what is it to count as abnormal? One way would be to to try to list                                         
the psychic states, social contexts, and so on that defeat normality. [..] But the the skeptic will                                 
suspect that we are packing and ethically loaded conception of normality into the definition                           
or moral terms, [...]. The “brute list” method looks too post hoc; it looks like we are ruling out                                     
as abnormal precisely the situations in which a person is not motivated to do what he or she                                   
believes to be the right thing. [...] If so, then internalism tells us nothing deep about moral                                 
terms in particular.”  37
 
Dreier wants us to overcome problems of ‘weakness of the will’ when we state internalism.                             
Such cases as mentioned before with depression etc. Michael Stocker in his article “Desiring                           






agent unable to act accordingly to their beliefs. One of his examples was a politician who in                                 
his youth devoted much time to argue for helping the poor and those in need, but in his age                                     
lost his will to do so because of “Lack of [the desire to do what one believes to be good] is                                         
commonplace. Through spiritual or physical tiredness, through accidie,               
through...despair,...one may feel less and less motivated to seek what is good” . I will from                             38
now on refer to such situations as ‘weakness of the will’, with respects to the thoughts                               
Michael Stocker posited in this article.   
 
It is problematic however, that Dreier uses the terms ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. He admits that                             
he has no clear cut explanation of why an agents situation is to be considered normal. The                                 39
result of this is that we are to make sense of an agents inability to be motivated based on                                     
some statistical matter of what’s normal. This seems intuitively unsatisfying, but the post                         
above illustrates the difficulties which arises when trying to formulate internalism in such a                           
way that it gives us insight into morality. We know that too strong formulations like (SI) does                                 
not work, as mentioned in 2.1 it cannot account for cases where ‘weakness of the will’ severs                                 
the connection between having a belief that something is morally so­and­so and the                         
motivation to act accordingly, and now it becomes more evident that Dreier’s ​modest                         
internalism​ is too vague. 
 
Let me illustrate with a fairly commonplace, non­moral example: I believe it’s good for me                             
personally and socially to get out of bed in the morning, and go to school. But I am having                                     
trouble finding the motivation to do so. Now, there could be a number of reasons of why I’m                                   
not actually pursuing what I so clearly understand as good for me, such as I might be                                 
depressed and this is a bad day for me, I might feel that the soft warmth of my covers is too                                         
strong of an persuasion to stay in bed, or I might just simply have not had enough sleep that                                     
night. In the case of depression it is easy to see how such a state would deprive me of the                                       
motivation to act upon what I believe to be good, but in the other cases we are just talking                                     
about ‘weakness of the will’. There are many different types of explanations as of why my                               





 It should be clear so far that I view the (PR) to be a better formulation than Dreier’s ​modest                                     
internalism​. The (PR) specifies better the need for a clause that points out cases where the                               
‘weakness of the will’ cuts the connection between belief and motivation. Never the less,                           





Elizabeth’s moral judgment contains the belief ‘racism is wrong’, this will reflect her moral                           
framework. Modest internalism then claims that since Elizabeth holds the belief that ‘racism                         
is wrong’, Elizabeth will be motivated to act accordingly­­ under normal conditions. We                         
could perhaps even make the claim that Elizabeth does not have to publicly announce the                             
belief from (1). So, all of the time under normal conditions, Elizabeth will not be say or do                                   
racist things. The belief from (1) is part of her moral framework, and her moral framework is                                 
part of her ​normal condition since the beliefs that make up her moral framework will have an                                 
intrinsic link to being motivated by them. 
 
“[...], speaker relativism can allow that what a person’s moral system is may depend on                             
factors extrinsic to that person. In central cases, the ones that have to be in the background to                                   
provide a standard of normality, an agent is motivated by what her moral system prescribes.”                             
(Dreier 1990, p.p 21) 
 
Now we have some insight into how Dreier imagines this theory to be able to account for                                 
internalism. Even though as I have mentioned, I do not think ​modest internalism to be a                               
perfect contender to account for internalism. The connection between speaker relativism and                       
the need for internalism seems clearer. But, as we have seen in the first chapter, moral                               






 Michael Smith in his 1995 article “Internalism’s Wheel” sets out to examine some internalist                           
moral theories, and argue what sort of difficulties they face. His claim is that most of them                                 
has little or nothing in common other than drawing on internalism to extend their reach from                               
judgement to action. After examining Dreier’s Speaker Relativism, and agreeing with me that                         
his ​modest internalism is too vague, the wheel turns to Gilbert Harman’s theory. In this                             
section we will examine the motivational features of Harman’s theory. But, before we delve                           
deeper into the world of Harman​, ​let me repeat what I consider to be one of Harman’s core                                   
aspects from section 1.2:  
 
“We make inner judgements about a person only if we suppose that he is capable of being                                 
motivated by the relevant moral considerations.”  40
 
Harman’s theory is closely related to Dreier’s, as mentioned by virtue of being contextually                           
based. But he has a different approach to motivation, which also plays a big role in his theory.                                   
I will go through how Harman’s theory is internalistic before considering whether or not it                             
passes Smith’s test of ​justified coercion. ​Harman expresses his thesis like this: “Ought (A, D,                             
C, M)”. Roughly explained Harman considers the indexical “ought” to revolve around an                         
agent A, and action D, consideration C and motivating attitudes M . So when an agent A has                                 41
the right motivational attitudes, given a consideration C the right course of action would be                             
D. This is what Harman explicates from the quote above. Harman goes on to explain that  
 
“[...] the attitudes M derive from an agreement. That is, they are intentions to adhere to a                                 
particular agreement on the understanding that others also intend to do so.” (Harman 1975,                           
p.p 12) 
 
The wording here is a bit unfortunate, and Harmans use of the word ‘intentions’ is puzzling.                               
It seems to be an informal and mutual understanding between a speaker who utters the                             









In this case, to be explicit, Elizabeth the speaker makes a judgement and gives Otto a                               
consideration (the inner judgement), which she believes Otto would agree to­­ which will                         
motivate Otto not to make racist remarks. In this sense, the motivational force is embedded                             
into moral judgements­­ and in the case of inner judgements they would have to be shared in                                 
some form for them make sense. So, what Harman seems to imagine is a speaker, and an                                 
agent who both actively takes part in the social structure of society. And so the speaker is                                 
able to make ‘inner judgements’ about an agent in such a way that the agent will agree. As                                   
my initial quotation of Harman in this section suggests, the agent will then be motivated by                               
the speaker­­ because they share a belief. A more schematic explanation of this would be: 
 
The speaker (A) says to the agent (B) that ‘(B) ought not to Φ’(an inner judgment), if B is                                     
motivated not to Φ, then the ‘inner judgement’ uttered by (A) is true (or successful). If (A)                                 
says to (B) that he ought to Φ, and (A) fails to motivate this in (B), then the ‘inner judgment’                                       
is false (it has failed). Whether or not an ‘inner judgment’ then fails or succeeds depends on                                 
whether or not (A) and (B) can come to be motivated by what their respective moral                               
frameworks elicits, if they converge on the same belief, they will both be motivated and the                               
‘inner judgement’ succeeds. 
 
Michael Smith in “The Internalism’s Wheel” finds Harman’s use of the word “intention” in                           
this just as puzzling, and proposes a different way of spelling it out to account for the way                                   









“If an agent believes that she would have a pro­attitude towards Φ­ing in C if she had a                                   
maximally coherent and rational set of pro­attitudes then she does indeed seem practically                         
irrational if she doesn’t actually have a pro­attitude towards Φ­ing in C.” (Smith 1995 p.p                             
290) 
 
For practical reasons I shall from now on refer to this account of internalism as ​coherence                               
internalism​. The ‘pro­attitude’ and ‘con­attitude’ should be understood as having a ​pro or ​con                           
attitude towards something, in the same sense as explained in section 2.1. If having an                             
‘attitude towards Φ­ing” is the same as being “motivated to Φ”, then, having a belief that                               
“Φ­ing is morally right” is the same as having an “attitude towards Φ­ing”. This comparison                             
might be unfortunate. It is usually widely held that having a belief constitutes a cognitivist                             
feature, while having an attitude is a non­cognitivist feature. If we are not to overlook the                               
distinction between cognitivism and non­cognitivism it would seem like Smith interprets                     
Harman’s theory as a sort of ‘hybrid­theory’. ​Prima facie​, I do not see any obvious                             
difficulties with this approach, and in the next section we will see one of it’s strengths. 
 
Compared to the other accounts of internalism this one includes ‘maximally coherent and                         
rational set of pro­attitudes’. In essence, what it means is that due to external aspects of                               
practical moral discourse, a speaker and an agent would want there to be a ​maximally                             
coherent and rational set of pro­attitudes. As in the example (2) above, Elizabeth’s potential                           
motivation to act according to her beliefs depends on a coherence between her beliefs and her                               
motivational attitudes, as well as her belief that Otto would share this belief, and her                             
motivational attitudes towards what she is proposing to him. The speaker (A) would want                           
agent (B) to agree with her that ‘Φ­ing is wrong’. (A) then utters an ‘inner judgment’ which is                                   
intended to motivate (B) to agree that ‘Φ­ing is wrong’. (A) wants (B) to accept this, because                                 
(A) has her own reasons to believing that ‘Φ­ing is wrong’, and must believe that this would                                 
also be the right thing for (B) to accept.   43
 
In a way then, since there is such a necessary connection between beliefs (judgements) and                             
motivation, we can just as well view the essence of making an 'inner judgement' as an attempt                                 
to motivate someone into doing what one self believes to be the right thing to do. When                                 
43 This line of reasoning follows from the ‘argument of (perspectival) immersion’ from section 1.5. 
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viewed from afar, Harman's theory seems unlikely at times, especially since 'inner                       
judgements' hinges on two people agreeing for the judgement to succeed. In practice, I think                             
Harman wants us to imagine the speaker to attempting to make a motivating gesture, not                             
necessarily that the speaker always expects it. In cases where there is obvious disagreement                           





So again let's picture Elizabeth making this judgement, and at this point it should seem                             
obvious what the result is, but spelling it out is not always the wrong thing to do, the neo­nazi                                     
is more than likely not to respond to Elizabeth's 'inner judgement' (even though this example                             
does not involve the standard 'inner judgement' of the form "A ​ought not to D", the ​ought in                                   
this sense is implied as ​ought­not when Elizabeth is making the judgement that a certain                             
action is wrong.), or argue against it. In other words, Elizabeth has failed to motivate the                               
neo­nazi, because they do not share the necessary beliefs for that to be possible by 'inner                               
judgements' alone. Harman suggests that such cases can be solved by using the language                           
differently, but we'll come back to that in the third chapter when we look at quasi­absolutism. 
 
It would seem like we have enough insight about Harman’s theory now to try and make sense                                 





In his paper ‘Internalism’s Wheel’ (1995) Michael Smith claims that in order to be consistent,                             
internalist theories needs to be able to account for three different criteria: First, (1) To be                               
able to account for moral judgments are beliefs, second, (2) it must be able to explain the                                 
connection between having said belief and being motivated to act accordingly, and lastly (3)                           
account for the distinction between justified and unjustified use of coercion. Both Harman                         
and Dreier’s theories can account for (1) and (2), but the trouble begins when we start putting                                 
them to the third test. 
38/67 
 For a moral theory to be able to make the distinction between justified and unjustified                             
coercion, might be the biggest problem for a relativist moral theory to tackle. It is closely                               
related to the ‘Argument from (Perspectival) Immersion’ from section 1.5, as it also is a                             
critique of what the concept of ‘flawless disagreement’ extends to. To quickly recap, it’s                           
pretty easy to explain and understand moral relativism from a ​bird’s perspective​: two                         
different people have different opinions on a moral question, because they belong to different                           
moral frameworks. But as soon as we immerse ourselves as one of the participants of a                               
discussion, it becomes pretty clear to us why it unacceptable that the other person is                             
disagreeing with us. With that in mind, Harman’s theory makes a lot of sense, why my                               
judgement is unable to motivate someone who disagrees with my beliefs is only natural.  
 
Smith’s argument from ​justified and ​unjustified ​coercion paints a picture which illustrates this                         
issue very well: 
 
“Imagine a conversation between two people, A and B. B says to A ‘you morally ought to Φ                                   
in C’, and A replies ‘It is not the case that I morally ought to Φ in C. Let’s suppose further                                         
that this conversation takes place in a context where B is in a position to coerce A, and that B                                       
says, by way of justifying his use of coercive power, ‘I morally ought to force you to Φ in C’.                                       
A denies this, saying ‘You morally ought not to force me to Φ in C’. (Smith 1995, p.p 285) 
 
The question at hand is simply, if a moral theory can distinguish whenever B is justified in                                 
his coercing of A, and when he is not. To help making out the importance of this distinction                                   
let’s look at a couple of examples. To expand on (2) above, when Elizabeth is making the                                 
judgment that ‘Otto ought not make racist remarks’, and let’s for the sake of argument                             
imagine that Elizabeth is in the position to coerce Otto into not making racist remarks.                             
According to Harman’s theory, then Elizabeth would be justified in her coercion of Otto, if                             
her inner judgement was successful. Since in Harman’s theory, both Elizabeth and Otto                         




I’ll mention at first, Smith’s own example­­ simply because it think it pretty neatly illustrates                             
his point, and the importance of this aspect of a moral theory . Imagine that B is a mugger,                                   44
who is holding up A at gunpoint. B the exclaims to A “You should give me your wallet”, and                                     
given the circumstances, A would most likely reluctantly give up his wallet to B. This                             
example can be schematically paraphrased as the quote in the beginning of this section. The                             
point of the matter is, even if B manages to motivate A to give in to his demands­­ an inner                                       
judgement would not have been successful in this case. This is an unjustified case of                             
coercion. The former example however, shows that when Elizabeth coerces Otto into not                         
making racist remarks, since the inner judgement is successful­­ Otto is more or less being                             
forced to act according to his own will. This could have been a good example of someone                                 
being persuaded into changing their beliefs, and thusly their motivations. I will get back to                             
looking at Harman’s theory in the third chapter, where I discuss the matters of deep                             
disagreement­­ and a possible solution to the problem. 
 
It should then, be quite evident that Harman’s theory can account for the distinction between                             
unjustified and justified coercion. But how does Dreier’s theory fare when faced with this                           
problem? Recall that Dreier’s speaker relativism depends on a weaker form of internalism to                           
be consistent. In Dreier’s case, we face the cold hard truth, that since his theory only bases                                 
it’s being true on whether or not an agents moral judgements is consistent with his or her’s                                 
moral system, the mugger and his victim is in sort of a stand off. When the mugger says to                                     
the victim that he should give him his wallet, the mugger is saying (M) “According to my                                 
moral system, you should give me your wallet in this situation”. For sake of argument, let’s                               
then assume that the victim would not be inclined to agree with such a statement, (V)                               
“According to my moral system, I should not give you my wallet in this situation.” Their                               
statements are merely incompatible with each other, even without adding a clause about                         
coercion. Let’s paraphrase: (M): “According to my moral system, I ought to force you to                             
give me your wallet” & (V): “According to my moral system, you ought not to force me to                                   








Dreier’s theory is unable to spell out the distinction between justified and unjustified                         
coercion. This is what we have to deal with because we are forced to take the moral systems                                   
in question into the equation when we are making our point. It hinges not on the people                                 
involved, and their respective moral judgements, but rather on claims about their moral                         
systems. This is an example of ‘distortion of topic’. I have to be honest though, and indeed be                                   
a bit charitable towards Dreier. I am not sure how much further than actually illustrating how                               
moral beliefs are relative to some parameter, and how we are motivated by beliefs, Dreier                             
actually intended to show with ​speaker relativism in the article at hand. What it extends to is                                 
unfortunately that it is not able to account for when a case of 'forced motivation' is justified or                                   
unjustified. We will get back to some possible solutions to the ​justified coercion problem in                             





The main difference between the Traditional Contextualist theories like Harman’s and                     
Dreier’s is as we saw in the first chapter, that Kölbel’s radical relativism and MacFarlanes                             
Non­indexical Contextualism is based on ​content preservation​. On the face of it, it would                           






In other words, ​p and ​~p. ​How then are we to account for the motivation which should follow                                   
in some sense by making such a judgement? So far we have gone through the strong                               
internalism account (SI), the practicality requirement (PR), ​modest internalism (as a                     
consequence of speaker relativism), and what I labeled ​coherence internalism based on                       
Smith’s interpretation of Harman’s moral relativism. As we can see the latter two                         
formulations are derivations of (PR), and we have established that Harman’s theory­­ and the                           
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coherence internalism is by far the most successful of the two. It now depends if genuine                               
relativism, which clings so hard to the principle of flawless disagreement, can account for                           
internalism in the same way that Harman’s theory can and overcome Smith’s third criteria.  
 
It seems intuitive that such a theory must depend on internalism to function, and especially in                               
the fact that it follows the content through time and disagreement with the intention to keep it                                 
preserved. Both Kölbel and MacFarlanes theories places the relativity of whether or not a                           
judgement is true on some ​perspective or ​parameter outside of the actual proposition. So, let's                             
then imagine an agent A, who judges that it is wrong to Φ in circumstances C. Given the                                   
practicality requirement then, A would be motivated to Φ in circumstances C, or she would                             
be practically irrational. We could perhaps explain motivation in the case of genuine                         
relativism, since it never hinges on making a reference to a certain parameter (such like                             
Dreier's speaker relativism does), that a proposition is simply stating the ​reason for why we                             
are motivated to act in certain circumstances. Consider Rationalism: 
 
(RI) "If it is right for agents to Φ in circumstances C, then there is a reason for those agents to                                         
Φ in C" (Smith 1994, p.p 62) 
 
Now, this form of internalism entails the (PR), in as a rational being would act according to                                 
however she believes it to be right, or she would be irrational. In the case of a person who                                     






Since (4) can be written as ​p​, and (5) can be written as "Kristina ​p​", Rationalism would be an                                     
explanation as why for example Kristina has certain beliefs­­ and why she has reasons to give                               
to charity, when she feels she can afford it. From what we have learned so far is that we want                                       
an account of internalism in the same fashion as Harman's theory gives, which can account                             
for the distinction between justified and unjustified coercion. By virtue of not giving                         
reference to moral frameworks, and normality Harman's theory does just that. From what we                           
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have learned from genuine relativism, there should not be any problem by using the same                             
type of model for moral motivation with the genuinists as Harman's. But their grip around                             
flawless disagreement could be a problem. So, what we are faced with here is actually the                               
question of whether propositions can retain their content in different contexts, while still                         
being able to motivate in the same matter as Harman’s ​coherence internalism can. If ​content                             
preservation relativists like Kölbel and MacFarlane can account for motivation in the same                         
sense as Harman can, and overcome the ​coercion problem​, then we may have found a way                               
around the (perspectival) immersion argument for the genuinists. 
 
The rationalist formulation (RI) entails the (PR), acting on the basis of having reasons must                             
be considered to be the rational road. The simple ​p and ​~p schematic of how the genuinists                                 
seems to view the propositional content of moral judgements, should be accompanied by                         
reasons for why they are there in the first place. This also follows from the argument of                                 
(perspectival) immersion. What we are looking for then, is whether or not the genuinist                           
approach to moral relativism can account for people being motivated by simply having a                           
reason to . And that reason is as simple as having a belief. One possibility to redeem the                                 45
genuinists from the problems arising from the argument of (perspectival) immersion is to                         





Externalist theories holds that motivation to act accordingly to one’s moral judgements are                         
not something intrinsically linked, but rather ​psychosocial reasons. In other words, they                       
believe that the reason we act according to moral beliefs are because we want to fit into                                 
society. They then throw away the metaphysical necessity between belief and motivation­­                       
and argue that they can account for motivation just as well as internalist theories does. A                               
classic example which tries to topple the internalist house of cards by denying this                           
connection, is the ​amoralists​. David Brink (1986, p.p 30 'Externalist Moral Reasons) wants                         




however never motivated to act in such a way, they presumably agree with social standards                             
which they recognize­­ yet do the opposite. The formulations of internalism we have looked                           
at so far, cannot account for such cases. 
 
There have been attempts to disprove this idea of amoralists, asserting that if there are no                               
substantive truth to this claim, then the conceptual claim can be maintained. But the most                             
successful argument against the amoralist is perhaps somewhere along the lines of what                         
Smith proposes in The Moral Problem . Smith wants us to imagine a blind person who has                               46
all the relevant information and data of what colour is. That is that the colour red is when                                   
light is reflected in such and such a way, the object which is reflected from will appear as red.                                     
Now, even though it this crude form we can say that it is a reasonably good explanation of                                   
the colour red. But we can not immerse ourselves in the same experience as of actually seeing                                 
something as red, and that understanding of seeing for instance a red apple. In the same way,                                 
Smith argues that the amoralists can account for what ‘good’ is, but in the same way they do                                   
not have the actual understanding of what ‘good’ is as someone who truly understands that                             
character ​.  47
 
This fits under a wing of argumentation Smith has called ‘moral fetishism’. crudely speaking                           
Smith argues that internalism because of it’s intrinsic connection between moral judgements                       
and motivation will not suffer under the problem of people who ‘act morally just because it’s                               
morally good’. In some way we can say that internalism then will guarantee that people are                               
sincere, when they truly believe something is right.  
 
Motivational Externalist Nick Zangwill proposes a ​Moral Content Externalism as an                     
alternative approach to moral motivation, and asks us to abolish the traditional ‘cognitivist vs                           
non­cognitivist’ distinction. A rather fresh breath in the discussion between externalism and                       







“We do better to frame the issue in terms of the ‘representational content’ of propositional                             
attitudes of ​all ​sorts­­ whether cognitive or non­cognitive. The issue, so characterized, is                         
whether or not we have propositional attitudes, ​the contents of which represents                       
mind­independent moral states of affairs​. [...] There is no reason why someone who thinks                           
that our moral ​judgements are cognitive with realistic moral content should not allow that we                             
also have ​non­cognitive states with realistic moral content­­ consider guilt, remorse and the                         
feeling of moral horror.” (Zangwill 2003, p.p 144) 
  
The kind of externalism Zangwill proposes (MCE) promotes two main feats: (1) to be able to                               
distinguish between moral and non­moral content, and (2) that moral beliefs must be                         
accompanied by moral desires.[insert footnote 'Zangwill 2003, p.p 147'] The kind of problem                         





This example involves a conditional, it involves a moral belief 'that it is right to give to                                 
charity', and that she should act upon that belief when the agent's economy allows for it. The                                 
latter is not a moral belief, what the MCE claims it can account for is the difference between                                   
the two, and that if Kristina has a matching moral desire to act on her moral belief she then                                     
will give to charity. The question at hand, which the internalists does not need to worry about                                 
is 'where does this moral desire' come from? Is it from the realm of what is viewed 'duty', or                                     
the realm of 'virtue'? We can easily imagine a person who gives to charity because they                               
believe it is their duty, or that a person who acts on the basis of what she believes the                                     
'virtuous person' would have done. In light of the fact that we're in this paper trying to                                 
account for moral motivation in relativist theories, the jump from having to base our moral                             
desires on anything else but the fact that if we have a belief that something 'is morally right to                                     
do', to what externalism always seems to have to explain away 'is morally right to do,                               
because...' seems like an easy job for Occam's Razor to me.  
 
Never the less, as opposed to what internalism can offer, illustrating what externalism is does                             
paint a broader picture of why internalism is the right way to go when we want to account for                                     
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how moral motivation works for relativist theories. The intrinsic link between moral                       
motivation and moral beliefs will also account quite easily for when someone changes their                           
beliefs. it is only natural then that the motivation will also change. A strong willed person,                               
and by strong willed I only mean that a person who will uphold their motivation matching                               
their belief.  
 
We can of course ask ourselves the question of, what this conceptual connection between                           
having a belief, and being motivated to act accordingly, actually consists of. Why is it that                               
when I judge that ‘making racist remarks is wrong’, and me watching my language as of not                                 
to come off as racist, that tether these two events? An externalist answer would of course be,                                 
social ​reasons, some form of ​institution etc. ​Prima facie it would seem like both social and                               
institutional reasons hinge on changing both the belief and the motivation. Externalism                       
abolishes the connection between belief and motivation, and one way of seeing what                         
determines our motivation is that social and institutional reasons also must determine our                         
beliefs. It does not seem plausible to be motivated to Φ, but believe that ~Φ is the right thing                                     
to do. That would be evidence of a very confused person, one which we would label as                                 
irrational. This is why it is been argued that one of the strongest feats of internalism is that it                                     
allows for us to very easily account for what happens to motivation when we change our                               
beliefs. 
 
The premise that ‘when we are motivated to Φ, we also hold the belief that Φ­ing is the right                                     
thing to do’, is something both internalists and externalists should accept. As we just saw                             
above, it seems very implausible that one can hold the motivation to Φ, but believe that Φ­ing                                 
is wrong. This illustrates that it is only the necessary conceptual connection, which the                           
internalists hinge on to make motivation explainable, the externalists believe that the                       
internalists are wrong about. But we see a possible argument for the internalists when we                             
look at changing our beliefs.  48
 
Imagine a teenager who grew up being told that white people are better than black people.                               
When this young man grew up he made racist remarks towards black people, promoting his                             
views which were tought him. Later in life he realizes that there are no race of whom is better                                     
48 Smith 1996 p.p 71 
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than other races, he changes his belief. It stands to right, to assume that he no longer has any                                     
motivation to make racist remarks, this would conflict with his belief. The internalist account                           
for this change of heart is simply that when the young man changed his supremacist beliefs,                               
he could not have been motivated to make racist remarks or else he would be irrational. He                                 
no longer has any reason to make them, and acts accordingly to his beliefs. On the externalist                                 
account it is a bit more complicated. First we need to account for what sort of reasons he had                                     
to change his beliefs, plausibly social reasons, and then we need to account for how these                               
reasons also promote his motivation to act accordingly. In virtue ethics it is often viewed as                               
taking the virtuous path to act accordingly to how some ideal person would have acted. In                               
this sense, the belief and motivation to act accordingly are being determined separately as                           
well. And that is not something which is easily accounted for. 
 
This fact that internalism can seemingly account for how motivation changes direction based                         
on people’s beliefs, or the ‘striking fact’ as Michael Smith called it, is a good example to                                 49
why being able to account for internalism is so important for the relativist theories. Relativist                             
theories must account for there being an infinite number of moral beliefs, a lot which are not                                 
compatible with each other, and there must be a corresponding number of moral motivations                           






In this chapter we had a look at internalism, and why it is important for moral relativism to be                                     
able to account for internalism. We also had a look at the relativist theories we were                               
introduced to in the first chapter, and how they would be able to account for internalism.                               
What we however learned the importance of the argument of (perspectival) immersion (API),                         
which we looked at in the end of section 1.5. Smith’s argument of ​justified coercion                             
illustrates the importance of a moral theory to, when we assume that belief and motivations                             




 What we most importantly should take away from this chapter is that Harman’s model neither                             
suffers from the (API), nor Smith’s argument of ​justified coercion. ​What seems to be the key                               
to this success is Smith’s interpretation of Harman’s internalist theory of motivation. It lets                           
moral judgments express both beliefs on the one hand, and an appropriate attitude meant to                             
act as motivating. A moral judgment then insists that the speaker is motivated to act                             
according to some belief, and that the agent (whom the speaker is addressing) should also act                               
accordingly. In section 3.1 we will address the remaining problem, which has been important                           
to consider throughout the whole paper: the distortion of topic. If Kölbel’s proposed solution                           
of a pragmatic interpretation is likely, then Harman’s approach to moral relativism seems to                           
be perhaps the best to account for the problem of immersion. 
 
The alternate route is to see whether genuine relativist theories which does not have the                             
problem of distortion of topic in the first place, can account for the problem of immersion by                                 
adapting to Harman’s idea of ​quasi­absolutism​. Then, whether or not they could account for                           


























This third chapter is devoted to take a closer look into how we are to solve a rather difficult                                     
position for a lot of relativist theories. It is namely that of ​Immersion​. Concluding the first                               
chapter we had a taste of the ‘Argument of (Perspectival) Immersion’(API), and we followed                           
up this issue in the second chapter when we had a look at the problem of ​coercion​. This                                   
section will first of all offer a summary of the previous two chapters to weed out the main                                   
lines of argument we will follow up on. Then, as I have mentioned earlier in the text, I will                                     
take us through Gilbert Harman’s Quasi­Absolutism , and see if there is something there                         50
which can help us overcome the issue of immersion. After looking at this solution to the                               
problem of disagreement, we will have a closer look into the question at hand: Can Harman’s                               
Quasi­Absolutism be compatible with genuine relativism, and will this land us safely with a                           
metaethical theory which makes moral relativism as viable contender to explain morality? 
 
First things first, let’s briefly summarize the first chapter. I began quite early to constrict my                               
own views of moral relativism. I said in the beginning that I don’t want us to view moral                                   
relativism as a sort of theory that allows us to be tolerant of everything people do in this                                   
world, simply because we can explain why something is morally wrong or right for them.                             
Diversity is a great argument to why we should seek understanding about different moral                           




 The first chapter we had a look at two types of moral relativism, the first one being the                                   
traditional ​contextualists and the second one mostly referred to as ​genuine ​relativism. We                         
established that the main difference between the two was that the traditional contextualists                         
bases their relativity on content made by the context. In other words, the content of an                               
utterance depends on who utters it. For example: When I utter the sentence ‘my cat is big’,                                 
what that sentence actually mean depends on the context. My cat is definitely not a big cat                                 
compared to other cats of his age, but he is bigger in relation to the size he ​was when he was                                         
a kitten​. ​In this line of reasoning, when someone utters a moral judgement, it is always to be                                   
viewed in relation to some parameter, which is often referred to as a moral system or                               
framework.  
 
One of the issues with these theories is brought up by the comparison between judgements                             
about morality and judgments about mass. As mentioned in section 1.5, when we are making                             
moral judgements we are implicitly also making reference to a moral framework­­ and we                           
want it to be understood as an implicit reference, or else we fall into the trap of ‘distortion of                                     
topic’. Harman’s comparison between moral judgements and judgements about mass is                     
probably just meant to illustrate the dependence on a parameter, and Kölbel points out that a                               
pragmatic approach to Harman’s theory would keep us away from distorting the discussion.  
 
We ended the first chapter by having a brief look at disagreement. The main issue of course is                                   
immersion. But it follows from worrying about whether or not we could immerse ourselves in                             
a discussion, that the discussion seems real. If we can not account for proper disagreement, as                               
in the cases with ‘distortion of topic’, then it would not amount to much to immerse one’s self                                   
in such a discussion. Genuine relativism then seems like a fine way of keeping the                             
disagreement real, but when we move from disagreements about trivial themes like taste to                           
moral issues, it becomes evident with the (API) in mind, that immersion is not that simple in                                 
a lot of cases. Either we need to constrict ‘flawless disagreement’, or we need to come up                                 




In the second chapter we started looking at a very important part of morality, that of                               
motivation. In the introduction I mentioned that Smith called it a ‘platitude’ that morality is                             
something practical. It is something that makes us act differently, either by refraining to do                             
certain things or by directly acting upon certain convictions. Internalism seems like the right                           
way to help account for moral relativism. The virtues of internalism, especially that of                           
Smith’s ‘striking fact’­­ that we change our motivation to fit our moral convictions, gives a                             
strong argument for internalism as a theory. The second chapter then, tries to have the moral                               
relativist theories from the first chapter, account for internalism.  
 
In the second chapter then I follow up on the problem of immersion by comparing the                               
different theories to Michael Smith’s test (See section 2.4) about justified and unjustified                         
cases of ​coercion​. The idea is simple, a moral theory should be able to account for whenever                                 
someone is forced to act against their will. After the second chapter we had learned that                               
Harman’s moral relativism can explain the phenomenon we are curious about, Dreier could                         
not­­ and I proposed that if we could make genuine relativism compatible with Harman’s                           
motivational theory we could perhaps avoid the problem of immersion all together.  
 
The third chapter, will begin by examining Gilbert Harman’s quasi­absolutism and see if                         
there is something we could learn about moral relativism in general, and the problem of                             
disagreement. What is evident is at least that Harman’s approach to quasi­absolutism tells us                           
that he is well aware of the problem that immersion can pose for such theories. We will then                                   
see how well such an approach could be compatible with genuine relativism, before we head                             





Concluding the first chapter I added a quote from Harman, which adds a clause about                             
objective truth conditions: 
 
(III): For the purposes of assigning ​objective truth conditions, a judgement of the form ​it                               
would be morally wrong of P to D​, has to be understood elliptical for a judgement of the form,                                     
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in relation to moral framework M, it would be morally wrong of P to D​. Similarly for other                                   
moral judgements. (Harman 1996 p.p. 43) 
 
The quote above is meant to solve the problem of fundamentally disagreeing parties. I                           




(2) If D judges validly that p, it will also be valid for D to judge that ​it’s true that p​.                                       
(Truth is Disquotational within a perspective) 
(3) If D judges that ​It’s true that p then D must, on pain of incoherence, judge that ​It’s                                   
false that not­p​. 
(4) If D that ​It’s false that not­p​, then D must, on the pain of incoherence, judge that                                 
anyone who judges ​not­p​ is making a mistake. 
Therefore, 





Harman seems concerned about the consequences from when two people have differentiating                       






This distinction is clearly acceptable to most people, even if one has a strong opinion on the                                 
matter, it should be fairly easy to accept that (A)’s beliefs are the negation of (B)’s beliefs.                                 












We know from section 1.2 that they are not actually expressing their moral beliefs, but rather                               








the (API) shows us that one of these two is wrong as long as we immerse ourselves in the                                     
discussion. Harman then seems to suggest that adding a clause in his moral theory, which                             
ensures that whenever we are making moral judgements we are making them ​as if they were                               
objective facts­­ such that we as moral agents will treat them convincingly . By ‘treating                           51
moral judgements convincingly’ I mean that when someone utters a moral judgement, one                         
will stand behind that conviction uttered and perhaps voice objection towards disagreement                       
with said conviction. If (A) voiced her beliefs on abortion to (B), who clearly disagrees with                               
(A)’s beliefs­­ and (B) simply says that (A) is right in her belief, it seems to be something                                   
wrong with (B)’s reasoning behind her own beliefs. This is what the (API) illustrates. 
 
Now there seems to be at least two different ways to account for such a fundamental                               
disagreement. First, let’s assume that (A)’s reasons for believing abortions to be morally                         




not­wrong is based upon humanitarian reasons. It stands to reason that when (A) and (B) are                               
discussing their disagreement their argumentation would follow from whatever reasons they                     
have for believing either ​p or ~​p​. In a way, their discourse would not go anywhere because of                                   
(A) arguments are based upon something entirely different than (B)’s beliefs are based on. A                             
trivial analogy to this would for example two people arguing about the temperature of the                             
bathwater, it would not make sense unless they could agree which parameters for measuring                           
temperature they would use. This could be an example of how explicit use of moral                             52
judgements could help the discourse. If (B)’s moral judgement, with reference to her moral                           
framework would help steer the discourse in such a way that they perhaps could resolve their                               
disagreement, or at least make sure that both (A) and (B) gets to express their disagreement                               
properly. If such an event would occur it would be hard to conclude that they are not actually                                   
expressing disagreement. Even if both (A) and (B) were to explain their moral judgements                           
with reference to their moral frameworks, we should in this sense be able to account for                               
disagreement.  
 
Now, in the second chapter, when we had a closer look to how James Dreier’s speaker                               
internalism would fare with Michael Smith’s test of justified use of coercion, we learned that                             
by giving reference to a moral framework to express their moral judgements we can not                             
properly account for unjustified or justified use of coercive power.  
 
Regarding faultless disagreement, I posited in the second chapter, by the end of section 2.5                             
that we perhaps would have to constrict the concept of ​faultless disagreement​. The (API)                           
directly poses a threat to this concept, and unless we can find a mistake in the (API), content                                   
preserving relativist theories might end up in the same pitfall as contextualism if they want to                               
keep holding on to faultless disagreement. And here is why: 
 
When I assert the moral judgement ​p​, I have in a way also asserted that ​~p is wrong,                                   
according to my moral framework. But I have never uttered the latter assertion, it is entailed                               
by the assertion of my initial utterance. When someone else then comes along and asserts ​~p​,                               




the pain of incoherence (from the API, line (4)), thinking that this person is making some sort                                 
of mistake. How can we reject (4) from the (API), without becoming absolutists?  
 
One solution is that I as a moral agent can acknowledge that I have made no mistake in my                                     
judgement that ​p​, and I can make the assumption that my interlocutor has made no mistake in                                 
her judgement that ​~p​. This way we both acknowledge that neither has made any mistake in                               
relation to our respective moral frameworks. This solution may save the concept of faultless                           53
disagreement from the (API), but I do not think it to be a salient solution to the problem of                                     
disagreement. It would seem like this sort of solution only allows us to confirm that our two                                 
moral frameworks are incompatible. In a way, I am agreeing that you have a moral                             
framework, and that you have made a judgement based on that particular framework. I am                             
also allowing your judgement, based on your moral framework, to be right. This is also a                               
kind of ​distortion of topic​. To keep the spirit of faultless disagreement alive, we have stopped                               
disagreeing about ​p​, but we are rather coming to an understanding about the moral                           
frameworks behind ​p and ​~p​. To solve the problem which the (API) poses then, faultless                             
disagreement might perhaps seem unattractive overall. 
 
The second way to account for such fundamental disagreement is more leading towards                         
Harman’s suggestion to let some sort of quasi­absolutist approach be the explanation for                         
fundamental disagreement. As the above quote in the beginning of the section suggests,                         
treating all moral judgements as if they were objective could help us understand more of a                               
person’s attitudes towards a moral issue. In section 2.1 I introduced expressivism as an                           
alternate to moral relativism, which in some ways is related to moral relativism as it allows                               
for different moral judgements to be expressed as attitudes. What is interesting about                         
expressivism, and attitudes is that they encourage motivation. In section 2.3 we saw Michael                           
Smith’s interpretation of Harman to involve moral judgements to express both beliefs and                         
attitudes. This ensured moral judgements to have both a side where moral discourse is                           





What then is quasi­absolutism? Harman wants us to consider the use of quasi­absolutist                         
language to solve the problem that arises when two people are fundamentally disagreeing                         
over a subject. In essence, what Harman is suggesting, is that whenever we fundamentally                           54
disagree over a subject, we use our language differently to make ourselves understood. What                           
I mean by fundamentally disagreeing is those situations where two speakers have                       
fundamentally different moral frameworks. If they had a similar moral framework, then it                         
would be a lot easier to pick out instances where one of the participants in a discussion was at                                     
fault. Fundamentally differing moral frameworks then is somewhat different, because from a                       
bird’s perspective both participants are correct.  55
 
What Harman suggests is that whenever two people are fundamentally in disagreement, we                         
express our attitudes towards certain standards.  
 
“In perhaps the simplest form of quasi­absolutism, a moral relativist projects his or her moral                             
framework onto the world and then uses moral terminology as if the projected morality were                             
the single true morality, while at the same time admitting that this way of talking is only “as                                   
if”. The supposed advantage of this quasi­absolutist usage is that it allows people with                           
different moral frameworks to disagree with each other. (Critics of the proposal might claim                           
that it only allows such people to appear to disagree with each other!)”  (Harman 1996 p.p 34) 
 
I believe the initial thought behind adapting the initial definition from section 1.2 to the one                               
mentioned in the beginning in this section was to avoid the problem of distortion of topic. As                                 
I have stressed at various points, I find it unlikely that people expresses their moral judgments                               
in the explicit form. It would seem like quasi­absolutism is a maneuver meant to allow for                               
explicit use of moral judgements in cases where the disagreement is fundamental. This way                           
the traditional contextualist could not only avoid the problem of the (API) , account for                           56










What Harman seems to suggest is that when we fundamentally differ over moral subjects, we                             
use expressivist language to promote our attitudes towards a certain moral judgement, which                         
we believe to be true. At the same time, quasi­absolutism allows us to express our beliefs                               
explicitly to whomever we are having a disagreement with, to make ourselves understood.  
 






(A) and (B) are fundamentally disagreeing, according to Harman they are expressing a belief                           
p and ​~p​, and from what we know of how these beliefs relate to motivation they also express                                   
an attitude. This is a sensible way to let a belief intrinsically be accompanied by a                               57
corresponding motivation. Recall from section 2.1 that according to expressivism, having an                       
attitude also constitutes having motivation. It is not far fetched to let a cognitive feature such                               
as ​belief​, which according to internalism also constitutes a corresponding motivation, also                       
express a non­cognitive feature like an ​attitude​, since the core aspect of having an attitude is                               
being motivated to act accordingly. 
 
(A) can then express (B)’s judgment, while at the same time expressing an attitude                           






In the previous section I made the claim that traditional contextualists are better equipped to                             
resist the problem of disagreement, despite the initial concerns about the distortion of topic.                           




but as we know they motivate their view by clinging to the principle of ​faultless                             
disagreement​. Matters of taste when we talk about food is an example of when it is relatively                                 
easy to accept that there is faultless disagreement, even as one of the participants of the                               
discussion. It is harder to comply with this principle when we talk about moral issues, as the                                 
(API) illustrates. In section 3.1 I outlined by reference to Paul Boghossian’s solution to                           
overlook the (API), but concluded that this sort of maneuver would only open up the                             
genuinists to the problem of distortion of topic. The solution then, could be to discard the                               
principle of ​faultless disagreement​, and see if they can account for motivation in the same                             
way as Harman. It is the fourth line from the (API) which concerns us, and is not compatible                                   
with the principle of faultless disagreement: 
 
(4) If D judges that ​It’s false that not­p​, then D must, on the pain of incoherence,                                 
judge that anyone who judges ​not­p​ is making a mistake. 
 
Faultless disagreement claims that even if two people (A) and (B) asserts a proposition ​p ​and                               
it’s negation, neither of them has made a mistake. As far as relativity goes, faultless                             
disagreement is not necessarily a faulty principle. As mentioned matters of taste, or even                           
judgments about mass or simultaneity can easily be described as to account for the principle                             
of faultless disagreement. However, these matters does not need us to immerse ourselves in                           
the discussion to get a complete understanding of what happens. If genuine relativism can                           
account for motivation in the same way as Harman, then not only would they be able to                                 
account for the concerns Smith’s argument of ​justified ​coercion​, but also avoid the genuine                           
problem the (API) poses.  
 
First of all, let me repeat Michael Smith’s interpretation of Harman’s motivational theory                         
from the second chapter: 
 
“If an agent believes that she would have a pro­attitude towards Φ­ing in C if she had a                                   
maximally coherent and rational set of pro­attitudes then she does indeed seem practically                         




Genuine relativism also consider moral judgements to express propositions, in the form of                         
beliefs. In the same way that expressivist language allows for relativist features, we can                           
assume that letting a non­cognitive feature to also be expressed by moral judgments. Genuine                           
relativists then should be able to accept that moral judgments can express the cognitivist                           
feature ‘belief’, as well as the non­cognitivist feature ‘attitude’. This motivational approach                       
for genuine relativism should open up the path to the use of quasi­absolutist language.  
 
If genuine relativism can accept that moral judgments asserts beliefs and expresses an                         
attitude, like the Harman’s theory it would be able to account for disagreement and                           
motivation in an intuitively satisfactory way. This way we could have our cake and eat it too.                                 
Faultless disagreement only claims that (A) and (B) are correct regarding their own respective                           
moral framework, neither of them has to accept each other's beliefs. Quasi­absolutism can                         
help illustrate that. 
 
Assume that (A) and (B) are disagreeing about the moral judgment “It is wrong of P to D”.                                   
According to the principle of faultless disagreement, neither of these are wrong according to                           
their own moral framework. However, the (API) teaches us that (A) should not accept (B)’s                             
judgement on the pain of being incoherent. If, genuine relativism can in the same way as                               
Harman accept that moral judgments expresses, also an attitude, then (A) can utter (B)’s                           
moral judgment and at the same time express and attitude against it. (A) and (B) will accept                                 
that they have different moral frameworks, but the use of quasi­absolutist language helps                         
them voice their actual disagreement instead of just the negation of the other’s utterance.  
 
As mentioned, genuine relativism does not suffer from the initial problem of distortion of                           
topic. Can the traditional contextualists overcome this problem? I think they can, and I think                             





Harman’s indexical contextualism then, was in the beginning the theory discussed here with                         
the most obvious flaw. When we left the first chapter behind I suggested, with reference to                               
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Kölbel, a pragmatic approach to Harman’s theory that could help us avoid the problem of                             
distortion of topic. To briefly recap: Distortion of topic is when due to reference to a moral                                 
framework, the discussion stops being about moral judgment. For instance, when Otto and                         
Elizabeth are disagreeing about whether abortions are morally acceptable or not. If Otto and                           
Elizabeth utter their moral judgements and we read them as explicit, the topic will be                             
distorted as we have learned from earlier points made in this thesis.  58
 
The initial moral judgement is of the form “It is wrong of P to D”, the semantic approach to                                     
indexical contextualism then, states that when we utter the sentence of the form “It is wrong                               
of P to D” we really mean “According to my moral framework, it is wrong of P to D”. We                                       59
know from the second chapter that according to Harman’s model, when we utter a sentence                             
of the form ”It is wrong of P to D” we are asserting a belief about the action D, as well as an                                             
attitude about D. However, the assertion we are trying to make is not about our moral                               
framework. When Otto says “Abortions are morally wrong”, Elizabeth will not be inclined to                           
accept this, because she disagrees. If Otto utters “According to my moral code, abortions are                             
morally wrong”, Elizabeth should be able to accept this. Otto is only making a statement                             
about his moral framework, and Elizabeth is not in place to be able to disagree with whether                                 
Otto’s utterance being in conflict with his moral framework or not.  
 
Elizabeth on the other hand could be in the position to claim that Otto’s moral judgment is                                 
incompatible with his own moral framework, if she (for example from another discussion or                           
conversation) had gained information about Otto’s beliefs. Let’s also assume that Otto is                         
honest, and has the possibility to change his views. But the example can happen, where                             
Elizabeth can point out inconsistencies with Otto’s utterances. To avoid the distortion of topic                           
issue then, we have to avoid viewing the explicit versions of an utterance being semantically                             
propositionally equivalent with the actual implicit utterances.  
 
“When i utter [abortions are morally wrong] and you utter the negation, then the​propositions                             
we express respectively are not by themselves incompatible. However, ​given the                     





incompatible. This explains the intuition that one cannot accept what the other has expressed                           
without changing one’s mind.” (Kölbel 2005 p.p 286, brackets added by me) 
 
What Kölbel is claiming here, is that when we deal with implicit utterances we can reject                               
them if we disagree. This also follows from (4) from the (API). If we are dealing with explicit                                   
utterances, we can accept them because no claim against our moral framework is made. It’s                             
simply stating a fact about ​some ​moral framework. Kölbel insists that if we presuppose that a                               
moral framework is underlying a moral judgment, we can to our best ability compare our                             
moral frameworks and see whether or not our beliefs are compatible. The problem with                           
distortion of topic seems to be one of immersion as well.  
 
Let me quickly recap my example from section 3.1. Agents (A) and (B) are disagreeing over                               
whether or not “It is morally right of P to D”. Let’s assume that (A) and (B)’s respective                                   
moral frameworks are consistent, and that (A)’s beliefs are religiously based and (B) bases                           
her moral framework on humanitarian beliefs. Their uttering the negation of the others moral                           
judgment will get them nowhere, and if they use their language explicit they are not actually                               
disagreeing at all. What we want to happen is (A) presupposing that (B)’s moral framework                             60
is based on humanitarian beliefs, such that (A) can know what (B) means by her utterances.                               
The existence of a moral framework should not be ignored then, but what we want to avoid if                                   
we’d like a discussion to stay alive is that we do not treat implicit utterances as                               
propositionally equivalent to their explicit versions. Kölbel’s more pragmatic approach to this                       
issue is more intuitively satisfying.  
 
When we consider our own moral beliefs, and our own moral utterances I do not think we                                 
often speak or think about morality in the explicit sense. I will also assume that most other                                 
people will not utter their moral beliefs as explicit utterances with reference to their moral                             
codes, convictions or framework. Intuitively it seems a lot more satisfying, what Kölbel                         
proposes with the pragmatic approach. We can presuppose that the people that are around us                             
are moral agents who have a moral framework, and our communication with them will only                             
help us understand our disagreements and our agreements by actually using the language to                           
60 It is one of those times when it would be acceptable to say “let’s agree to disagree”. 
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This thesis set out to explore a few issues which follows in the wake of moral relativism. I                                   
wanted initially to shed light on moral relativism as a valid meta­ethical theory. The fact that                               
this multicultural world we live in differ in so many key aspects should be reason enough to                                 
seek an understanding about moral relativism. The problem at hand is that of immersion. It is                               
easy enough for philosophers, academics and theorists to schematically set forth a world in                           
which morality is consistent and coherent. But the problem of immersion is one where we                             
actively have to imagine what the most reasonable thing that a person would say and do. 
 
The first chapter I dedicated to give an introduction to some aspects of moral relativism. We                               
concluded that there are (at least) two types of moral relativism. Traditional contextualism                         
which places the relativity of the content in relation to the context, more so than often this                                 
context is a moral framework. On the other hand we have the genuine relativists, sometimes                             
referred to as alethic relativism. This form of relativism places the relativity differently. They                           
regard the truth­value of a moral judgment to be determined by the moral framework, ​after​,                             
the context of use is determined. In other words, the content of an utterance stays the same                                 
regardless of who and when utters it­­ we could say that genuine relativism is that of ​content                                 
preservation​. 
 
Another thing we learned from the first chapter is the fact that traditional contextualism                           
suffers greatly from a problem called ​distortion of topic​. This is what occurs if the approach a                                 
sentence such as “It is wrong of P to D” as propositionally equivalent to the explicit form                                 
“According to my moral framework, it is wrong of P to D”. This issue is important regarding                                 
disagreement. If I in a solo­case utter the explicit form of a moral judgment I am not actually                                   
making a moral judgment, but stating a fact about my moral framework. I am entitled to do                                 
so, and in some cases this is what I mean to do. However, in the case where I am disagreeing                                       
with another person I cannot utter the explicit form. The explicit form will distort the                             
discussion from me disagreeing about a moral matter with another person, to me just stating a                               
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fact about my moral framework. It could even be considered that we do not even understand                               
the extent of our disagreement. The problem of distortion of topic then, is a real one which                                 
must be overcome in order to convincingly have moral relativism account for something as                           
trivial as disagreement. 
 
On the other hand, we learned from section 1.5 that genuine relativism, even if steering clear                               
of the problem of distortion of topic, also cannot account for disagreement in a fully                             
satisfactory way. Their problem lies with holding on to the principle of faultless                         
disagreement. In short, it states that two people voicing their beliefs will be correct in their                               
assertions, and neither will have made a mistake (be at fault). By the end of section 1.5, by                                   61
reference to Mark Richard, we see a compelling argument against the validity of faultless                           
disagreement in practice. In short, the Argument from (Perspectival) Immersion, claims that a                         
person making a moral judgment has their own reasons for believing it in the first place.                               
When another person voices their negation of this moral judgment, we must (on the pain of                               
incoherence, from the fourth line) judge that they are wrong (at fault, or has made a mistake).                                 
The (API) is convincing enough to shed some light on the discussion, and I proposed that                               
perhaps Harman idea of using quasi­absolutist language to account for deep disagreement                       
might be the way for the genuinists to go. 
 
The second chapter I wanted to help paint a broader picture of the discussion by having a                                 
look at internalism. If there is such a thing as an intrinsic link between having a belief and                                   
being motivated to act accordingly, it seems shallow to treat moral beliefs without taking the                             
motivation into consideration. I begin the second chapter by having a brief look at a theory                               
called expressivism, which greatly differs from the ones discussed in the first chapter by                           
virtue of being non­cognitivist. This simply means that expressivism doesn’t consider moral                       
judgments to assert propositions, but rather express attitudes. More importantly, we took note                         
of the fact that it is broadly accepted that having an attitude towards something is considered                               
to be motivated to act accordingly. 
 
I had a look at several internalist theories, and even a brief look at an alternative externalist                                 
idea­­ but the main concern was one raised by Michael Smith regarding ​justified ​and                           
61 See sections 1.4 and 3.3 
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unjustified use of coercion ​. The idea that a moral theory must be able to account for when                                 62
someone is being forced to act against their will. This too is a way of stating a problem of                                     
immersion. By the end of the second chapter it became evident that even though initially                             
faced with overcoming distortion of topic, Harman’s traditional contextualism could more                     
easily overcome problems which directly related to that of immersion. Harman’s theory                       
doesn’t suffer from the (API), and it can account for Smith’s concerns about ​coercion. ​At this                               
point we had also sneaked a peek into if genuine relativism was compatible with this form of                                 
motivational account , and we could infer that it too had the potential to account for the three                                 63
criteria Michael Smith suggests: (1) account for moral judgments as asserting beliefs, (2)                         
account for the relation between having a belief and being motivated to act accordingly, and                             
lastly (3) account for justified and unjustified use of coercion .  64
 
In the third and final chapter then, I revisit the idea of quasi­absolutist language as I proposed                                 
in the end of section 1.5 to a possible way of letting genuine relativism be able to account for                                     
deep/genuine disagreement. Before getting to genuine relativism, I restated and explicated                     
why Harman’s theory allows for quasi­absolutism by again having a look at what the                           
motivational account results in. The strongest part of Harman’s theory is that it allows us to                               
state our belief, and at the same time express an attitude. This feature helps us keep track of                                   
when the use of coercion is justified or unjustified, and it also helps us in the cases where we                                     
simply have fundamentally differing moral opinions. By use of quasi­absolutist language in                       
cases where we obviously disagree we can help keeping the discussion alive by stating moral                             
judgements ​as if they were objective truths. This way we can express our disagreement with                             
people whom we fundamentally disagree with, by stating our understanding of their moral                         
framework and at the same time expressing an attitude towards the asserted belief. This                           
account should help the genuine relativists overcome their problems with immersion, because                       
it let’s us constrict the principle of faultless disagreement to only function in a bird’s                             







Moral relativism as a metaethical theory does not need to find the means for us to solve our                                   
disagreements and moral issues with each other as moral agents. It needs only help us                             
account for what actually happens when we disagree, and it needs to account for this                             
convincingly. If we cannot immerse ourselves as the moral agents described by a theory,                           
which intention is to give an account of how morality works in the real world, then the moral                                   
theory we have at hand is faulty. I hope that this thesis can, above anything else, shed some                                   
light into the fact that treating morality as relative need not set us on a path where we have to                                       
tolerate everything other people say and do, just because we can explain why they say and do                                 
the things they do. I do think it’s safe to assume that it is not only the people in my personal                                         
vicinity who reacts to moral relativism as a intuitively true theory, but they would never                             
accept faultless disagreement if it meant that we had to accept other people’s opinions. The                             
(API) helps us illustrate that.  
 
What remains is the distortion of topic, and keeping to the idea that a moral theory should be                                   
able to account for moral judgements and disagreement convincingly I believe that the                         
pragmatic approach to Harman’s theory must be kept, in order to let quasi­absolutist language                           
be a possibility. If we can allow the constriction of faultless disagreement, and the pragmatic                             
approach to moral judgments­­ we have two versions of moral relativity which can help us                             
account for how morality works. 
 
After all, we will never find true agreement on all moral matters. 
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